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DESIGNING A BETTER CARBON TAX:
ONLY WITH REINVESTMENT
STEPHEN SEWALK*
ABSTRACT
The objective of a tax on emissions is to curtail total discharges.
Ever since Rio and Kyoto, this seems to be an elusive goal. Many papers
have been written on the topic, but none actually solve the dilemma of
how to proactively reduce emissions. This Article seeks to solve this issue
by designing a better carbon tax to reduce U.S. emissions 90% by 2050.
The first step needed is to extend and explain the economics of a carbon
tax with reinvestment. I examine and graphically show the economics of
the tax and subsequent reinvestment of revenues into building clean
power plants. I consider a carbon tax applied uniformly to goods and
services based on emissions intensity. This simplifies the challenge of
applying the tax by creating a tax structure that is applied in a manner
similar to a sales tax, but uses the value added tax (“VAT”) structure. A
carbon tax is traditionally associated with cost certainty. To make the
tax benefit certain, I propose to use the tax revenues to build new power
generation, thereby replacing existing facilities, significantly reducing
emissions. This also significantly reduces future energy costs, thereby
refunding the monies paid by the people and I demonstrate this using
economic graphs. However, while realizing that this is the best policy
proposed to date, it does not solve emissions from transportation. There-
fore, I take the next step and propose that the tax policy needs to in-
clude a directive to convert fossil fuel transportation to fuel cell, battery
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and electric vehicles. Doing so results in U.S. emissions declining 90%
by 2050.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article’s objective is to propose a solution to reduce U.S.
emission 90% by 2050. This is done by developing the legal and economic
rationale for a carbon tax policy along with a transportation policy re-
placing CAFÉ standards, and then examining the results and implica-
tions of achieving this objective in economic terms specifically for U.S.
households. However, to do so it is necessary to understand why this is
necessary. Since the 1990s, the world has been implementing carbon
policies that have not reduced emissions and therefore not solved the di-
lemma of climate change.1 To achieve my goal, I review what has occurred
in terms of policy/legislation proposals and their actual or proposed impact.
1 See Hsiao-Tien Poa & Chung-Ming Tsai, Multivariate Granger Causality Between CO2
Emissions, Energy Consumption, FDI and GDP: Evidence from a Panel of BRIC Coun-
tries, 36 ENERGY 685, 691–92 (2011).
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I then introduce combined carbon tax and transportation legislation/
policy and using economic and engineering models, I graph the results
of implementing my proposal.
A. Climate Change and Political (In)Action
There was great hope with the Earth Summit (1992, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil),2 followed by the Kyoto Protocol3 requiring developed
countries to curtail greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, that countries
would act in a united fashion to tackle climate change.4 Rio, followed by
Kyoto,5 set out a goal to unite the world and reduce emissions, yet the
law of unintended consequences created a boom in foreign direct invest-
ment (“FDI”) into developing countries as seen in Figure 1.
2 Rio de Janeiro hosted the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) from June 3 to June 14, 1992. The conference concluded with the Earth
Summit, where leaders from 105 countries gathered to demonstrate their commit to
sustainable development. At UNCED over 130 nations signed a Convention of Climate
Change. The delegates reached agreement on Agenda 21, an action plan to promote
sustainable development in the 21st century. The concept was simplified to developed
nations paying developing nations to protect the environment and the developed world
should take the lead in reducing global emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 based
on the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change prediction regarding global
warming. See generally STEPHANIE MEAKIN, THE RIO EARTH SUMMIT: SUMMARY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1992), available at
http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp317-e.htm [https://perma.cc/HHD9
-W4BM] (summarizing the events and results of the Rio Earth Summit).
3 Following the Earth Summit where countries joined the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), the increasingly perceived need for action
led to these countries launching negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate
change resulting in the Kyoto Protocol being adopted in 1997. See generally Background
on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, U.N. FRAMEWORK CON-
VENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php [https://
perma.cc/PS5C-Z6NG] [hereinafter UNFCCC Background] (describing the background
and timeline of the international response to climate change) (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
4 Id.
5 The goal of the Kyoto Protocol was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2%
compared to the year 1990 by the year 2010. Press Release, U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Industrialized countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2%,
(Dec. 11, 1997), http://unfccc.int/cop3/fccc/info/indust.htm [https://perma.cc/9GJS-26QW].
The agreement did not include developing countries. Nor did anyone anticipate that
investment into developing countries and resulting emission levels would boom as a
result of companies diversifying their industrial base away from developed countries with
potential emissions caps to developing countries with no caps.
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Figure 1. FDI inflows to emerging economies, 1990–2010 (billions of $)
Source: GMID (2012)6
Developing countries were not included in Kyoto, as a result these
countries were not assigned emissions objectives or restrictions.7 It seems
Kyoto led to rapidly rising exports as well as emissions from these coun-
tries.8 When developed countries announced they could cap emissions,
multinational companies anticipated higher costs and moved operations
by shifting FDI into developing countries—as it allowed countries to bene-
fit because they failed to enact legislation internalizing environmental
costs—which resulted in a more polluted world.9
The largest amounts of FDI investment were directed to the
BRICs.10 This FDI investment fueled exports while increasing domestic
growth (expanding global demand for oil, coal and natural gas).11 By
6 Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni, Foreign Direct Investments in Real Estate Sector and
CO2 Emission: Evidence from Emerging Economies, 24 MGMT. ENVTL. QUALITY 463, 464
(2013).
7 John M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental Tax Leakage
and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L.
149, 161 (2010).
8 See id. at 157, 165.
9 See id. at 157–59.
10 BRICs, a term coined by Goldman Sachs in the 1990s to represent the largest and quickest
growing developing countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China.
11 Poa & Tsai, supra note 1, at 691–92.
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fueling exports, multinational companies magnified global sourcing,
thereby further boosting emissions.12 The reason China blames importers
of its goods and services for its emission explosion, assigning one-third of
emissions to exports,13 was an unintended consequence of Kyoto. However,
since 2000, emissions produced within the borders of the United States
and the EU have leveled.14 But if emissions intensities were used, that
is GDP divided by total GHG emissions, including those of exports and
imports, then total United States and EU emissions have skyrocketed.15
Meanwhile, forests are continuing to be cut or burned down in Malaysia
and Brazil, contributing to global emissions.16
As FDI continues to expand, emissions have only increased, with
the potential that global climate change could change the landscape and
characteristics of planet Earth.17 Over the past fifteen years, twelve are
the hottest on record and the largest spike in temperatures in recorded
history just happened in February 2016.18 Further, oceanic temperatures
have hit record highs with Arctic ice melting faster than most models
had predicted.19 A 50-year study by NASA found that tropical forests
are able to absorb less carbon dioxide as temperatures rise.20 GHG21
12 Id.
13 Duncan Clark, West blamed for rapid increase in China’s CO2, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 22,
2009), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/feb/23/china-co2-emissions-climate
[https://perma.cc/9A22-ZDNW].
14 This is primarily due to carbon leakage of industry moving from the United States, EU
and Japan to China. It is possible Kyoto had the unintended result of increasing global
emissions by moving production from low emission intensity countries to high emission
intensity countries.
15 See generally Clark, supra note 13.
16 A carbon tax policy needs to take this into account, thereby discouraging Brazil and
Malaysia from cutting down their forests.
17 See Stephen Sewalk, Project Financing an Energy Revolution in the USA, 3 THE ENG’G
PROJECT ORG. J. 141, 141 (2012).
18 Jason Samenow, The planet had its biggest temperature spike in modern history in
February, CAPITAL WEATHER GANG (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2016/03/14/the-planet-had-its-biggest-temperature-spike
-in-modern-history-in-February/ [https://perma.cc/4FTP-G53B]; see Barack Obama, Presi-
dent of the United States, We Need to Act (June 25, 2013) (transcript available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/-we-need-to-act-transcript-of-obama-s-climate-change
-speech.html. [https://perma.cc/GCQ4-CJEM]).
19 Id.
20 See Weile Wang, Variations in Atmospheric CO2 Growth Rates Coupled With Tropical
Temperatures, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13061 (2013), available at http://www.pnas
.org/content/early/2013/07/17/1219683110 [https://perma.cc/2LS6-AXUX].
21 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Mar. 21, 1994, 1771
U.N.T.S. 165 (defining “greenhouse gases” as “those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere,
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emissions22 attributed to humans represent the majority of the tempera-
ture rise over the past fifty years according to analyses conducted by cli-
mate scientists. Earth may already be irreparably damaged from changes
to the atmospheric composition from excess carbon emissions according to
some climate scientists.23 The bulk of anthropogenic GHGs are from using
fossil fuels, per the opinion of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”).24 Fossil fuels helped our species grow and survive, coun-
tries and industries depend on these, yet if we continue to produce and
consume them, we put ourselves in danger.25 The general populations’
increasing awareness and knowledge of the effects on climate change from
increasing GHGs in the atmosphere is increasing pressure on nations to
deal with their carbon emissions.26 A politically acceptable solution to slash
levels of emitted GHGs is needed now or Earth’s habitable environment
may be transformed irreversibly jeopardizing the future of our own species.
Breakneck unchecked increases in GHG emissions are creating an
environment of momentous uncertainty leading to potential of unpredict-
able and immitigable environment impacts. Climate change on a global
scale could lead to melting glaciers, ice, and snowcaps increasing ocean
levels, and altering global weather patterns (creating unintended droughts
and floods).27 The sea level of the oceans has risen approximately eight
both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation”), available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/unfccc_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KG9-KBNK]
[hereinafter WNFCCC]; see also David G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CAN.
TAX J. 2063, 2065 (2003) (explaining that different gases have different effects on global
warming, so emissions are standardized to CO2 equivalents when measuring effects on
global warming).
22 See Camille Parmesan, Beyond Climate Attribution in Conservation and Ecological
Research, ECOLOGY LETTERS, Special Issue May 2013, at 58, 58, available at http://online
library.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ele.12098/epdf [https://perma.cc/P92W-B2M9].
23 See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationary is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Prin-
ciples for Climate Change Adaptation Law, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV., no. 1, 2010, at 9.
24 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), RENEWABLE ENERGY
SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 3, 7 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds.) (2012),
http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Full_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/79WS
-8ABM] (showing that in 2004 56.6% of CO2 from fossil fuels was the highest single
emission comprising the GHG composition).
25 See Ove Hoegh-Guldberg & John F. Bruno, The Impact of Climate Change on the
World’s Marine Ecosystems, 328 SCIENCE 1523, 1523 (2010).
26 Stephen Sewalk, Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade in Favor of Carbon Tax with
Reinvestment to Reduce Global Emissions, 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T
355, 358 (2014).
27 Brian C Murray & Heather Housterman, Climate Change, Cap and Trade, and the
Outlook for U.S. Policy. 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 699, 699 (2009).
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inches, since 1880, due to global warming.28 According to climate scientists,
the oceans could rise anywhere from twenty to eighty additional inches
during this century.29 This will displace millions globally, in just the United
Kingdom, it could affect almost 500,000 properties,30 and the risk would
influence all countries with ocean shorelines.31 Approximately 2.6 million
homes32 in the United States with five million people are located at four
feet or less above full tide.33 Climate change impacts infrastructure, agri-
culture, and lifestyle resulting in decreased net worth and standards of
living; this is especially true for developing country communities based
on agriculture with an economy sensitive to climate variations.34 Many
of the world’s developing countries are particularly vulnerable to climate
change, due to their economies being primarily agriculture-based.35 For
all of the meetings since Kyoto, it seemed Copenhagen held the most
promise of agreement and progress.36
Concerning Copenhagen, the “ultimate objective of [the Climate]
Convention and any related legal instruments . . . is to achieve . . . [the]
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
28 Ben Strauss et al., Surging Seas, CLIMATE CENTRAL 2 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://slr.s3.ama
zonaws.com/SurgingSeas.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRD5-Q72S].
29 Id.
30 This would be equivalent of a taking of 500,000 properties in the United Kingdom,
because once sea levels rise these properties will be of zero value. See Lizzie Dearden,
House prices map of England and Wales lets you see average cost of homes in your area,
Independent (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/house
-prices-map-of-england-and-wales-lets-you-see-average-cost-of-homes-in-your-area-1006
7239.html [https://perma.cc/3NXC-22G5] (explaining that with conservatively valuing
such properties at $200,000 the loss would total around $100 billion loss).
31 ENVTL. AGENCY & DEP’T ENV’T FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, NATIONAL FLOOD AND COASTAL
EROSION RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR ENGLAND 14 (2011), available at https://www
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228898/9780108510
366.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK8D-WYEE].
32 Should oceans rise four feet, just forty-eight inches (within the twenty- to eighty-inch
range) this would be equivalent to a massive loss of wealth. Assuming homes are only
worth $200,000 on the shore (conservative estimate) would imply a loss of $520 billion.
If they are worth on average $400,00 or more this century could see losses in the $1 trillion
in property values of just the United States.
33 Strauss et al., supra note 28, at 20.
34 THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE
37 (2010) [hereinafter World Development Report].
35 Id. at 40.
36 Jutta Brunnée, From Bali to Copenhagen: Towards a Shared Vision for a Post-2012
Climate Regime?, 25 MD. J. INT’L. L. 86, 86 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.law
.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol25/iss1/7 [https://perma.cc/86WN-BZSU].
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level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system.”37 This was the foundation of meetings for Rio, why
negotiations and agreement took place for the Kyoto Protocol, setting the
foundation for post-2012 commitments.38 With recent scientific analysis,
there is now a sense of urgency emerging around the objective.39 Publi-
cation of the Fourth Assessment Report by the IPCC in 2007 created a
greater seriousness during discussions40 and provided unequivocal evi-
dence that humans are creating climate change.41 In this report, the
IPCC indicated that GHG emissions should plateau by 2020 and decline
significantly by 2050 to realistically avert dangerous levels of global
warming.42
By 2009, it appeared that the largest GHG polluting countries
were eager to specify that the world would need to limit warming to two
37 UNFCCC, supra note 21, art. 2.
38 States, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental observers routinely
invoke the objective in submission to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Coopera-
tive Action (“AWG-LCA”). For access to submissions made since the AWG-LCA’s first
session in March 2008, see U.N., Documents of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term
Cooperative Action Under the Convention, http://unfccc.int/meetings/adhocworkinggroups
/lca/items/4918.php [https://perma.cc/B6HS-ZBTG] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). See, e.g.,
U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE AD HOC WORKING GRP. ON LONG-
TERM COOP. ACTION UNDER THE CONVENTION, Ideas and Proposals on Paragraph 1 of the
Bali Action Plan (2009).
39 See Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global
Warming to 2ºC, 458 NATURE 1158, 1158 (2009) (noting that “[m]ore than 100 countries
have adopted a global warming limit of 2ºC or below (relative to pre-industrial levels) as
a guiding principle for mitigation efforts to reduce climate change risks, impacts and
damages” (citation omitted)).
40 See Richard B. Alley et al., IPCC 2007: Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (Susan
Solomon et al. eds., 2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1
-spm.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLC2-D5KH]. An increasing number of people warns that
even the IPCC’s worst-case scenarios are too conservative and that global climate change
is occurring at a much faster rate than expected, due to various feedback effects. PEW
CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, Key Scientific Developments Since the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report (2009), http://arnmbr.org/content/images/uploads/Pew-Key-Scientific
-Developments-Since-IPCC-4th-Assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9WC-ATG4].
41 See Alley et al., supra note 40, at 2–3 (considering it to be “very likely,” i.e., more than
ninety percent certain, that anthropogenic factors account for these increases).
42 Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION.
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 25, 38–39, 90 (B. Metz et al. eds.,
2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-ts.pdf [https://perma
.cc/XHW5-7WPC].
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degrees Celsius from levels at the start of the industrial revolution.43
This first occurred at the G8 Summit (2009) in their declarations, the
second when President Obama summoned the seventeen countries of the
Major Economics Forum (“MEF”) on Energy and Climate, representing
eighty percent of global emissions.44 The Copenhagen Accord also con-
firmed the two-degree Celsius benchmark.45 This did not satisfy everyone,
especially African and small island states, greatly concerned for their
future, who pushed heavily for a temperature limit of 1.5 degrees Celsius.46
To appease developing countries and assist them in mitigating climate
change, developed countries committed to creating an annual fund of
$100 billion under the Copenhagen Accord.47 This fund is to be in place
by 2020, and the key question is how to raise these funds, which I develop
in a future paper.48 The fifth assessment report49 from the IPCC indicates
43 G8 Leders Declaration, Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, ¶ 65 (2009),
http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AA6H-NX55].
44 Id.; Press Release, The White House, Declaration of the Leaders: The Major Economies
Forum on Energy and Climate (July 9, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
-office/declaration-leaders-major-economies-forum-energy-and-climate [https://perma.cc
/6N92-4MPY].
45 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Fifteenth Sess., Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–18, 2009, Draft Decision -/CP 15:
Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18,
2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07
.pdf [https://perma.cc/238B-KUSD]; PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, Fifteenth
Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change and Fifth Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
(2009), http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/copenhagen-cop15-summary.pdf [https://perma
.cc/XL8K-36TQ]; UNFCCC Background, supra note 3.
46 Ed King, UN Climate envoys urged to accelerate loss and damage planning, CLIMATE
HOME (June 6, 2013), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2013/06/05/un-climate-envoys
-urged-to-accelerate-loss-and-damage-planning/ [https://perma.cc/6GVE-395E]. AOSIS,
the Alliance of Small Island States are very concerned that with climate change they will
no longer have a home. African countries worry that climate change will change weather
patterns endangering their livelihoods.
47 Steven Ferrey, Changing Venue of International Governance and Finance: Exercising
Legal Control over the $100 Billion per Year Climate Fund?, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 26, 26, 30
(2012), http://hosted.law.wisc.edu/wordpress/wilj/files/2013/01/Ferrey.pdf [https://perma
.cc/NSZ2-XAPN].
48 Jonathan Pickering, Climate finance: getting to $100 billion a year by 2020, DEVPOLICY
BLOG FROM THE DEV. POL’Y CNTR. (Nov. 10, 2010), http://devpolicy.org/climate-finance-get
ting-to-100-billion-a-year-by-2020-20101110/ [https://perma.cc/CNU8-4PK4].
49 See generally Pachauri et al., IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, in
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf
/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EUQ-X9Z5].
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that significant action is needed now, not later, to enact legislation to
reduce emission levels, resulting in growing demand for action on domes-
tic and international climate change legislation to significantly reduce
GHG emissions.50
Given all of the concern for global warming, the IPCC framework
as well as COP meetings (including Copenhagen and Durban), it would
seem that progress would have been made on reducing emissions, yet
globally greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase, see Figure 2.
Figure 2. Rapidly Rising Developing Country Emissions
The global financial crisis of 2008 caused global greenhouse gas emis-
sions to decline by 1% in 2009.51 However, in 2010 emissions increased
50 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art.1, May 9,1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 168
(defining “greenhouse gases” as “those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both
natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation”); see also David
G. Duff, Tax Policy and Global Warming, 51 CAN. TAX J. 2063, 2065 (2003) (explaining
that different gases have different effects on global warming, so emissions are standard-
ized to CO2 equivalents when measuring their effects on global warming).
51 J.G.J. Olivier et al., Long-Term Trend in Global CO2 Emissions: 2011 report, PBL
NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY & JRC EUR. COMM. (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.pbl.nl
/sites/default/files/cms/publicaties/C02%20Mondiaal_%20webdef_19sept.pdf [https://perma
.cc/D9KA-M6D7].
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by more than 5%, a rate of increase that was unexpected and unseen in
two decades.52 For the Annex I countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol,
along with the United States (non-ratifying), emissions have declined
approximately 7.5% since 1990.53 These countries remain on target to
achieve the 5.2% collective reduction by 2012.54 However, not anticipated
by the creators of Kyoto is how rapidly emissions in developing countries
have increased from less than one-third to more than half.55
From 2003 until 2010, Chinese CO2 emissions doubled and Indian
emissions increase exceeded 60%.56 Chinese emissions grew 10% to 9
billion metric tons in 2010.57 India’s emission levels rose 9% in 2010 to
1.8 billion metric tons.58 Brazil and South Korea emissions rose respec-
tively by 12% and 9%.59
B. Taxing Carbon, Existing and Proposed Policies
Carbon has been effectively taxed for over twenty years.60 While
addressing carbon emissions requires the creation and desire to tax
carbon, the question to ask is if it will result in emissions declining or is
simply an additional source of government revenues.61 Because of the
simplicity of a carbon tax, papers typically discuss some or all of these
issues. They are: (a) sectors to include in taxation, (b) the size of tax,
(c) usage of the tax revenues, (d) the impact to consumers’ wallets and
(e) the affect the tax will have on reducing emissions (i.e., price elasticity
of demand) and if this will achieve the stated objectives.62 The majority
of the literature applies a carbon tax to fossil fuels, meaning oil or gaso-
line, coal and natural gas, which influence for example, the price elastic-
ity of demand.63 Table 1 summarizes existing carbon tax policies.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Olivier et al., supra note 51.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Jenny Sumner et al., Carbon Taxes: A Review of Experience and Policy Design Con-
siderations, NAT’L REV. ENERGY LAB (Dec. 2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47312
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XRM-746Z].
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF CARBON TAX POLICIES
Source: NREL64
64 Id.
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The tax rates for actual policies, as seen in Table 1, vary widely.
Sweden, for example, set its rate to $105 per metric ton of CO2, but this
rate is substantially less for industry at $23. Norway taxes gasoline at
the equivalent of $62 per metric ton of CO2, Finland at $30. These rates
are displayed in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Carbon Tax Rate Policies in U.S. Dollars
Source: NREL65
The key question though is do these carbon taxes reduce emissions
and if so by how much? How have these actual and proposed policies and
their tax rates reduced emissions, and would they be enough to avoid cli-
mate change? The Energy Modeling Forum (“EMF”) 16 at Stanford Univer-
sity analyzed projected costs to adhere to Kyoto’s objectives to reduce
emissions seven percent below 1990 emissions by 2012.66 The results,
shown in Table 2 indicate the price range for the models based on whether
emissions trading is allowed.67 Note that prices from 1990 to 2014 have
increased by 88% on a nominal basis.68 Therefore, it would be reasonable
to assume that these prices are 88% higher in 2014 U.S. Dollars.
65 Id.
66 Forecasting the Future Value of Carbon: A Literature Review of Mid- to Long-Term Carbon
Price Forecasts, ECOSECURITIES (Jan. 30, 2009), https://www.nwcouncil.org/media/4755
/20090130_Carbon_Price_Forecasts_NWPCC_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BDX-UYDV].
67 Id.
68 Inflation calculator, CALCULATOR.NET, http://www.calculator.net/inflation-calculator
.html?cinterestrate=1&cincompound=1990&cinterestrateout=1.01470&coutcompound
=2014&x=87&y=7 [https://perma.cc/457D-JQTM]. In order to quickly calculate approxi-
mate 2014 prices from estimated 1990 prices, I used the inflation calculator, and discovered
a difference of 88%. Id.
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TABLE 2: STANFORD UNIVERSITY EMF 16 CARBON PRICE FORECASTS
Source: NW Council69
The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions modeled the
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 to understand the
expenses required to achieve the goals set forth in the bill.70
TABLE 3: LIEBERMAN-WARNER IMPLEMENTATION COSTS, PEW CENTER
CARBON PRICE FORECASTS
Source: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. Analysis of the
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008.71
69 ECOSECURITIES, supra note 66.
70 Analysis of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, CTR. FOR CLIMATE &
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/federal/congress/110/lieberman-warner-climate
-security-act-2008 [https://perma.cc/QZ2W-7PMZ].
71 Insights from Modeling Analyses of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 2191),
PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (May 2008), http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/L
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As can be seen the price estimates are $22 to $61 per ton by 2020,
increasing to $48 to $257 per ton by 2030 and range from $121 to $189
by 2050. The goal under S. 2191 was to reduce U.S. emissions 40% by 2030
(from 2005 levels, a reduction of 11% from 1990 levels) and 56% by 2050
(from 2005 levels, a reduction of 25% below 1990 levels).72 The “business
as usual” (“BAU”) calculations show the potential impact to GDP. These
costs are very significant but consistent with the theory that demand for
energy is inelastic and the price for elasticity of demand is proof of this.
The Heritage Foundation proceeded to examine the costs of the Waxman-
Markey Bill.73 Their analysis of this Bill shows the price of carbon will
exceed $120 per ton of CO2 by 2035.74 Annual GDP losses are forecast to
exceed $600 billion per year.75 The projected reductions in emissions were
3% by 2012 (from 2005 levels) and 83% by 2050.76
Put simply, a program to tax or cap carbon that focuses solely on
demand will result in a very high tax rate to dissuade consumers from
using carbon intensive products (energy and power). In addition, note,
just because a carbon tax is implemented does not mean that emissions
will actually decline. Norway, which implemented a carbon tax in 1991,
saw emissions increase by 15% from 1991 to 2008 and received negative
press because of this.77 However, Norway also experienced a 70% in-
crease in GDP.78 So although Norway learned to use energy much more
efficiently on a per dollar GDP basis,79 because its energy sources did not
change, its total emissions increased.
-W-Modeling.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ABC-BSPS].
72 EPA Analysis of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008: S. 2191 in 110th
Congress, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange
/Downloads/EPAactivities/s2191_EPA_Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/75TZ-B8GX].
73 William W. Beach et al., The Economic Consequences of Waxman-Markey: An Analysis
of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 6,
2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/08/the-economic-consequences-of
-waxman-markey-an-analysis-of-the-american-clean-energy-and-security-act-of-2009
[https://perma.cc/6LB9-78NK].
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Leila Abboud, An exhausting war on emissions: Norway’s efforts to contain greenhouse
gases move forward—and backfire, WALL STREET J., (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122272533893187737.html [https://perma.cc/W9FB-2EHN].
78 Id.
79 If GDP increased from 100 to 170 and emissions increased from 100 to 115, this means
the same energy unit produced 47.8% more GDP (170/115 = 1.478), resulting in an econ-
omy that was 32.4% more energy efficient (1 – 115/170 = 32.4%).
784 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:769
C. European Unilateralism: A Special Case
Seeking to show the world how to move forward and frustrated
with the international community’s progress on reducing global emis-
sions, the EU set up the EU-ETS in 2005, with the stated goal of reduc-
ing global emissions.80 The EU-ETS (cap and trade) was structured to
minimize GHGs from ‘deemed’ polluting industries (electricity providers,
cement plants, iron and steel factories and refineries)81 throughout
Europe.82 Europe set out to develop and sustain a carbon marketplace
that would incentivize financing low or no carbon technologies.83 Hailed
as a large success when implemented, it has not succeeded in achieving
its objectives.84 The EU-ETS has resulted in poor economic efficiency and
unrealized environmental goals since its inception,85 and great concern
that many European Parliament Members (“MEPs”) are ready to bail on
the EU-ETS.86 The European Parliament rejected on April 16, 2013 a
measure that would have bolstered the faltering program,87 leading to
new lows in the carbon market price for allowances.88 This not only has
consequences for trade but also is bad for the European economy, which
has become increasingly dependent on energy and infrastructure.89 It
seems that the EU-ETS is faltering and will fail to achieve its objective.
Because the structure does not create certainty for industry and consum-
ers, no one is able to plan for the future as prices gyrate too often as seen
in Figure 4, which shows this instability due to over-allocating allowances
for emissions within the EU-ETS.90
80 A. Denny Ellerman, THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE
ii–3 (2008).
81 Julien Chevallier, Banking and Borrowing in the EU ETS: A Review of Economic
Modelling, Current Provisions and Prospects for Future Design, 26 J. ECON. SURV. 158,
158–63 (2012).
82 Ricardo Coelho et al., Green is the Color of Money: The EU ETS Failed Model for the
“Green Economy”, 173 CARBON TRADE WATCH 1, 1 (2013).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Anna Petherick, Holding Out Hope, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 534, 534 (2013).
86 Carbon Trading: ETS RIP?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 2013.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See David Victor & Linda Yueh, The New Energy Order, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 25, 26 (2010).
90 Alex Scott, EU Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme in Freefall, CHEMICAL & ENG’G
NEWS (Feb. 18, 2013), http://cen.acs.org/articles/91/i7/EU-Carbon-Emissions-Trading
-Scheme.html [https://perma.cc/X2BH-DWDX].
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Figure 4. Price Instability in the EU-ETS
Source: ICE Futures Europe (Note on graph: The top line represents the
December 2020 contract, and the bottom line represents the Nearest
contract.)
Because of these price gyrations and declines in the EU-ETS,
Europe’s coal consumption increased91 due to Europe being very depend-
ent on Russian gas.92 Coal, as an available and viable alternative to
Russian gas, might increase further to minimize this dependence due to the
uncertainty of Russian supplies in good times93 (Russia cut off supplies
91 Europe’s dirty secret: The unwelcome renaissance, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2013, http://www
.economist.com/news/briefing/21569039-europes-energy-policy-delivers-worst-all-possible
-worlds-unwelcome-renaissance [https://perma.cc/QCL4-SP26].
92 Kit Gillet McClatchy, Europe fears its dependency on Russian natural gas as U.S., EU
sanctions near, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 16, 2014, http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/03/16
/3998968/europe-fears-its-dependency-on.html [https://perma.cc/384Y-CQ47].
93 EDWARD CHOW & ANNE HUDSON, CTR. STRATEGIC INTL. STUDIES, THE RUSSIA-EU GAS
RELATIONSHIP: A PARTNERSHIP OF NECESSITY (2013), https://csis.org/publication/russia-eu
-gas-relationship-partnership-necessity [https://perma.cc/6MXL-NVJ9].
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in 2006 and 2009). Greater uncertainty has arisen given the political
tensions caused by the invasion of Crimea in the Ukraine94 and the
takeover of a major natural gas station.95
I. CARBON TAX ELEMENTS
A. Development of Policy to Tax Carbon
As noted originally, the objective of this Article is to set up an
innovative policy that taxes carbon, which results in massive reductions
of emissions and examines the results and implications of achieving
this objective in economic terms specifically for U.S. households. Policy
makers, economists, and lawyers have all proposed taxing carbon in one
manner or another. The key challenge, as Pindyck96 stated, is how do we
price carbon when the reality is we do not know the correct price? All
policy developers generally concur with Pigou,97 Baumol98 and Coase99 that
emissions are an externality. That this externality (i.e., pollution, global
warming, and climate change) is caused by anthropogenic emissions100
and has resulted in a social cost. Moreover, that the best way to address
94 Anthony Faiola & Will England, Ukraine denounces ‘invasion’ by Russian forces on eve
of Crimea’s referendum, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 15, 2014, available at http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/world/europe/tensions-mount-as-crimea-prepares-for-referendum
/2014/03/15/a384c36a-ac40-11e3-a06a-e3230a43d6cb_story.html [https://perma.cc/FN5T
-NSUS].
95 Doug Schoen, With Takeover of Natural Gas Station, Russia Ratchets Up Tension With
Ukraine, FORBES, Mar. 16, 2014, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen
/2014/03/16/russia-invades-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/4H82-TYBH].
96 Robert S. Pindyck, Pricing Carbon When We Don’t Know the Right Price, REGULATION
43–46 (2013).
97 See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192–93 (Transaction Publishers
2002) (4th ed., rev. prtg. 1952). For a review of the theory behind environmental taxes, see
A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and Regulation, 3
HANDBOOK OF PUB. ECON. 1471 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). Several
papers consider design issues from a general perspective, such as how to set the tax when
there are administrative costs of collection. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs, 19 J. PUS. ECON. 385 (1982).
98 William J. Baumol, On taxation and the control of externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
307–22 (1972).
99 R. H. Coase, The Problem with Social Costs, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1–44 (1960).
100 For a list of GHGs, see Susan Solomon et al., Technical Summary: Contribution of Work-
ing Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007), https://www.ipcc
.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/spm.html [https://perma.cc/T4H5-UAGX].
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the externalities caused by these emissions is to tax them, thereby in-
ternalizing the costs. Without internalizing costs, consumers are receiving
the wrong price signals (goods and services are too cheap)101 and over-
consuming as a result.102
Taxing carbon (GHG emissions), increases the price of goods, leads
to reduced consumption (due to higher prices), and encourages producers
to either reduce output and/or produce more efficiently (less emissions
per good), which will be followed by a reduction in associated emissions.
This decreases the social costs and associated impact of climate change.103
Multiple papers exist that discuss how to develop or design a carbon tax;
Metcalf and Weisbach believe that most of these are limited in scope and
poorly designed.104 Further, they note that some of these proposals have
been introduced in Congress, but have not been passed.105
The majority of carbon tax papers (the majority of which examine
the United States) fail to address 100% of emissions, including Metcalf and
Weisbach,106 Waggoner,107 Bryner,108 and many others.109 These authors
are uncertain as to the actual reduction in U.S. emissions from applying
the carbon tax, and therefore are unsure of the impact on consumers.110
101 All goods and services will be referred to as goods.
102 Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 499 (2009).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 During the 10th Congress, the House introduced two bills. See Save Our Climate Act
of 2007, H.R. 2069, 110th Cong. (2007); America’s Energy Security Trust Fund Act of
2007, H.R. 3416, 110th Cong. (2007). Rep. John Dingell also put forth a proposal but did
not actually introduce it. In the current session of the 111th Congress, H.R. 3416 has
been reintroduced. See America’s Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2009, H.R. 1337,
111th Cong. (2009).
106 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 102.
107 Michael J. Waggoner, The House Erred: A Carbon Tax is Better than Cap and Trade,
124 TAX NOTES 1257 (2009).
108 Gary Bryner, Reducing Greenhouse Gases Through Carbon Market, 85 DENV. U. L.
REV. 961, 969 (2008) (discussing cap-and-trade approaches to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions).
109 James M. Poterba, Tax Policy To Combat Global Warming: On Designing a Carbon
Tax, MIT CTR. FOR ENERGY POL’Y RESEARCH (outlining the design of a carbon tax in
March 1991), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/50159/28596145
.pdf?sequ [https://perma.cc/6LFA-XXPS] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
110 Jonathan Ramseur & Larry Parker, Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options
and Considerations, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Mar. 10, 2009) available at https://www.fas
.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40242.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB87-3DP3].
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Returning to Pindyck, the key challenge all papers examining the law
and/or economics of a carbon tax face is trying to determine the exact
price for carbon.111 This is because a carbon tax affects the price of goods,
meaning it increases their prices. Using an economic concept—the price
elasticity of demand112—consumption declines, resulting in declining
emissions. The key assumption here is that consumers cannot switch to
goods that are not taxed, i.e. imports, and that alternative goods will be
supplied to the market that are either produced with fewer emissions or
their consumption results in lower emissions.113
Because of the importance of the price elasticity of demand, it is
necessary to explain this concept, which is rarely (if ever) explained in
these types of articles.
B. Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand (“Ped”) is a key concept to under-
stand in order to design a carbon tax and present how the tax influences
total emissions. To calculate the Ped, it is necessary to take the percent-
age change in quantity demanded and divide by the percentage change
in price.114 If Ped=0, this means demand is perfectly inelastic, meaning
demand does not change no matter how high or low the price.115 If Ped is
between 0 and 1 (0 < Ped < 1), demand is considered to be inelastic as
shown in Figure 5a.116 This means that a price change of say 10% (price
increases by 10%) will lead to a less than 10% decrease in quantity
demanded (consumed).117 These are shown in Figure 5:
111 See Pindyck, supra note 96, at 43–46.
112 James Peck, Principles of Microeconomics: Elasticity, OHIO STATE DEP’T OF ECON.,
http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jpeck/H200/EconH200L5.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL26-YX7V]
(last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (explaining microeconomic theory and calculations of price
elasticity of demand).
113 Gaurav Akrani, Demand in Economics—Law of Demand—Elasticity of Demand,
KALYAN CITY LIFE (Aug. 26, 2009), http://kalyan-city.blogspot.com/2009/08/demand-price
-law-of-demand-determinants.html [https://perma.cc/E3X2-KHUL].
114 Peck, supra note 112.
115 Inelastic, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/inelastic.asp [https://
perma.cc/HLU4-HNV3] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
116 Peck, supra note 112.
117 Elasticity, ECON. TUITION SINGAPORE (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.econs.com.sg/free
-downloads/elasticity/ [https://perma.cc/YU7Z-CJSM].
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Figure 5. Price Elasticity—Inelastic and Elastic Demand
If Ped is 1 then demand is considered to be unit elastic, meaning a 10%
increase in price results in a 10% reduction in quantity consumed.118 And
if Ped is > 1, then demand is considered to be elastic, meaning a 10%
increase in price results in a more than 10% reduction in consumption.119
The opposite happens if price decreases.120
This is important to understand because energy in general is
considered price inelastic especially in periods of less than one year
(considered short run).121 They are still inelastic in the long run (more
than one year), but less so.122 This is illustrated below in Figure 6 by
comparing summer consumption of gasoline from 2000 to 2012 with
retail prices:
118 Peck, supra note 112.
119 ECON. TUITION SINGAPORE, supra note 117.
120 Id.
121 Aaron Menenberg, Why Energy Demand Grows with the Economy, ECONOMONITOR
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.economonitor.com/policiesofscale/2012/09/28/why-energy
-demand-grows-with-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/RM4Y-LT4F].
122 Id.
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Figure 6. U.S. Summer Gasoline Demand and Prices, 2000–12
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy
Outlook (“STEO”),123 April 10, 2012.124 Note: The 2012 figures for summer
gasoline demand and retail gasoline prices are projections from EIA’s
Short-Term Energy Outlook.125
While there are well over 100 studies of the price elasticity of
demand, I examined gasoline meta-data research, which determined
gasoline’s price elasticity of demand. Espey compared 101 different studies
for the United States in the short run (less than one year) price elasticity
of demand, which is -0.26; this implies a 10% price increase leads to a
2.6% reduction in quantity demand.126 However, as all markets are al-
ways more price elastic in the long run, she determined price elasticity of
demand is -0.58, implying a 10% price increase results in a 5.8% reduction
123 Short-Term Energy and Summer Fuels Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 11,
2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/ [https://perma.cc/4RCD-6GB7].
124 Today in Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.eia.gov
/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6010 [https://perma.cc/KC23-ZCAH].
125 Id.
126 Molly Espey, Explaining the Variation in Elasticity Estimates of Gasoline Demand in
the United States: A Meta-Analysis, 17 ENERGY J. 49, 60 (1996).
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in quantity demand.127 In the long run, customers adjust by changing ve-
hicles and driving less.128 A similar study was conducted in the UK129 that
produced price elasticity of demand to be -0.25 and -0.77, meaning a 10%
increase in prices results of -.025 and -.077.130 Note: if incomes increase
this may offset a price increase.131 The price refers to the real, not nominal
(or inflated) price.132
Gasoline, in fact, is one of the most heavily taxed carbon products
in the world.133 Out of 155 countries surveyed, the United States had the
44th cheapest gas prices on July 15, 2008.134 While U.S. consumers were
paying $3.45 per gallon, consumers in Eritrea paid $9.58, Norway $8.73,
Germany $7.86, Kuwait $0.90, Saudi Arabia $0.45, and Venezuela $0.12
per gallon.135 The difference in prices is dependent on government taxa-
tion or subsidies.136
This concept is critical to understanding that applying carbon
taxes to the demand side alone will not solve climate change. At present,
there are few substitutes for gasoline, and simply taxing energy only
increases the costs of alternatives, it does not promote or encourage
substitution to lower-emission sources of energy.
C. Sources of Emissions
For the successful implementation of a tax, it will be necessary to
ensure that relatively accurate country stocks of GHGs (sources and
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See Mark Hanly, Joyce Dargay, and Phil Goodwin, Review of Income Elasticities and
the Demand for Road Traffic, CENTRE FOR TRANSPORT STUD., 1 (Mar. 2002), http://www
.tcd.ie/Economics/msceps/courses/understanding%20markets/12a.%20Income%20elas
ticity%20and%20road%20traffic%20UK.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M6V-KS5C].
130 Phil Goodwin, Joyce Dargay, & Mark Hanly, Elasticities of Road Traffic and Fuel
Consumption with Respect to Price and Income: A Review, 24 TRANSPORT REVS. 261, 270
(2004).
131 Id. at 272.
132 Real vs. Nominal, WHATISECONOMIC, http://www.whatiseconomics.org/macroeconomics
/real-vs-nominal [https://perma.cc/RN2W-4DW9] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
133 Brad Plumer, The U.S. has some of the lowest energy taxes in the developed world,
WASHINGTON POST WONKBLOG (Jan. 31, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2013/01/31/how-the-world-taxes-fossil-fuels-in-three-charts/ [https://perma.cc
/9KAD-FULN].
134 Steve Hargreaves, U.S. Gas: So cheap it hurts, CNN (July 15, 2008), http://money.cnn
.com/2008/05/01/news/international/usgas_price/ [https://perma.cc/86YN-Z5D2].
135 Id.
136 Id.
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sinks) are determined. This data seems reasonably available, as Figure
2 shows. In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)137
prepared a report titled “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks” stating that the United States emitted carbon dioxide equiva-
lents of roughly 6.7 billion metric tons.138 An amount roughly equal to
approximately 19% of total worldwide emissions, excluding those from
land change.139
Four sectors generate the majority of emissions.140 Three of these
sectors burn fossil fuels.141 The three are: (1) utilities and industry, (2)
transportation, and (3) buildings (commercial and residential).142 Utilities
produce GHG by using carbon-based fuels to generate electricity used by
the other sectors.143 The EPA then allocates the emissions from genera-
tion of electricity to sectors using the power.144 To do this, the EPA allocates
based on carbon intensity and mix of fuels used.145 After allocation the
distribution of emissions utilities/industry, transportation and buildings
is 26.1%, 34.1% and 39.8% respectively.146 Prior to these allocations, the
utilities/industry sector is responsible for 57% of total emissions, trans-
portation for 32% (need to transfer 2.7% for street signals and lights,
etc.) and building sector only represents 11% of total emissions as it does
burn natural gas (heating and hot water) along with some other fuels,
such as diesel.147 The utilities/industry sector is the primary concern,
given that it is the leading generator of GHG emissions.148 The fourth
137 See Trends in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, available at http://www.epa.gov/cli
matechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html [https://perma.cc/4YXJ-QD3X].
138 Climate Change Indicators in the United States: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA,
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/science/indicators/ghg/us-ghg-emissions.html
[https://perma.cc/4D7S-FB7N] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
139 Global Emissions Greenhouse Gas Data, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghg
emissions/usinventoryreport.html [https://perma.cc/WDR6-PE3S] (last visited Mar. 20,
2016).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the U.S., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/ghg_report/ghg_overview.cfm [https://perma
.cc/YJ5S-G27K].
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, EPA (Apr. 15, 2012), http://
www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main
-Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTA2-6499].
148 Id.
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area is Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (“LULUCF”), a very
important sector for other countries.149
In order to control and limit global emissions, it is necessary
to include LULUCF emissions, especially in realizing the amount of car-
bon contained in imports due to LULUCF.150 These are important to
solving climate change mitigation.151 The agricultural sector or Land Use
(“LU”) is responsible for approximately 14% of global anthropogenic GHG
emissions.152 LU will continue to have a high rate of growth unless con-
trolled, due to increasing populations and rising incomes.153 Land-Use
Change and Deforestation (“LUCF”) accounts for an additional 17% of
total emissions.154 Combined, these two sectors (“LULUCF”) account for
31% of total worldwide emissions.155 Using Brazil as an example, once
LULUCF emissions are included, the country is one of the largest global
emitters of GHGs.156 For example, in 1994 LULUCF accounted for 55%
of total Brazilian GHG emissions, which totaled 1.7 billion metric tons.157
Brazilian action on reducing LULUCF is critical to saving the Amazon,
which represents 40% of remaining global rainforest.158 A properly struc-
tured tax would include these emissions in calculating the tax on Brazil-
ian imports, ensuring that Brazil would be eager to take action to reduce
their GHG emissions, or they could likely find that their manufactured
goods and mineral exports may end up not being competitive on the
world market.
Understanding these four areas of emissions is critical to developing
a carbon tax that will address, and therefore reduce, global emissions.
149 See generally Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Sector Emissions, EPA, http://
www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/lulucf.html [https://perma.cc/653Y
-DQMH] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Carlos Cerri et al., Brazilian greenhouse gas emissions: the importance of agriculture
and livestock, 66 SCIENTIA AGRICOLA 831, 832 (2009) available at http://www.scielo.br/pdf
/sa/v66n6/a17v66n6.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DSK-DWA7].
153 Lenny Bernstein et al., Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 14, 37 (2008).
154 Cerri et al., supra note 152, at 832.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Hans-Peter Meister et al., Floating Houses and Mosquito Nets: Emerging Climate
Change Adaptation Strategies Around the World, MEISTER CONSULTANTS GP. at 76 (2009),
available at http://www.forestclim.eu/fileadmin/Bilder/Dokumente/IFOK_2010_Emerging
_Climate_Change_Strategies_Around_the_World.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5PV-NVMU].
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II. CARBON TAX DESIGN
To design this carbon tax strategy, I considered all of the required
variables. These include: (a) which sectors to tax (all); (b) the tax rate
(certainty); (c) tax revenue use (reinvestment); (d) consumer impact; and
(e) the affect the tax will have on reducing emissions; and (f) if this will
achieve the objectives set to reduce emissions to prevent the globe from
warming by more than 2ºC.
A. Sectors to Tax
As discussed in the previous section, there are four primary
sectors. These are utilities/industry, buildings (commercial and residen-
tial), transportation, and LULUCF. Concerning the tax base, it is neces-
sary that all emissions are included. This all-inclusive tax collects the
funding downstream on all goods and services; this structure encourages
everyone to support low carbon emission power plants/industry, build-
ings, and transportation, as well as minimize LULUCF.159 Unlike other
proposals, there are no winners or losers, per se. Through 2011, the EU-
ETS cost the EU economy $287 billion, according to UBS Investment
Research, and the result was “almost zero impact” on the total GHG
emissions within the EU.160 Rather than simply reallocate monies, if the
EU had spent the same amount of funds to replace or upgrade existing
power plants and improve energy efficiency, emissions could have been
lowered upwards of 40% in the EU.161 In the scheme I developed, all goods
and services, that is 100% of emissions (United States, EU, China, etc.)
are taxed. The tax is based on carbon emissions intensity and is collected
downstream, not upstream as Metcalf and Gilbert,162 Waggoner163 and
many other carbon tax papers purport. It is anticipated that tax collection
costs will be low as the tax is collected alongside the sales tax that exists
in forty-five U.S. states.164 The tax as explained in Section IV is collected
159 This structure results in collecting carbon taxes on 100% of a country’s carbon emissions.
160 Sid Maher, Europe’s $287bn carbon ‘waste’: UBS report, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 23,
2011, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/europes-287bn-car
bon-waste-ubs-report/story-fn59niix-1226203068972 [https://perma.cc/YSA3-H4DT].
161 Id.
162 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 102.
163 Michael J. Waggoner, Why and How to Tax Carbon, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 1, 1 (2008).
164 State-by-state Guide to Taxes on Retires, KIPLINGER (2013), available at http://www
.kiplinger.com/tool/retirement/T055-S001-state-by-state-guide-to-taxes-on-retirees
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using country-level emissions intensity for all goods and services.165 Unlike
in other carbon tax (design) papers, there is no tax credit or offset pro-
vided to fossil fuels that have not been consumed or burned.
To further simplify matters, this tax is simple in design. For ex-
ample, it uses the value of asphalt (as with any other good or service) to
calculate a carbon tax using a standard emissions intensity,166 rather
than complicate matters and debate if distillates are sequestered into
asphalt or emitted as proposed by other authors.167 This is done to dis-
courage the use of goods produced with our current energy systems, as it is
not the asphalt’s fault that it is a dirty but effective cheap road building
technology. Rather, it is contingent on all of the people within each country
to demand clean technology, making everyone essentially responsible for
using that country’s current (dirty) technologies. Therefore, the intent of
this carbon tax design is to create a tax that taxes all emissions gener-
ated or created in a state, country or region, by using emissions intensity,
which implies taking the total of all emissions divided by GDP. This would
therefore encourage more efficient operations economy-wide by taxing all
goods and services (including agricultural). Additionally, there is the
demand-side impact of a carbon tax, which occurs by increasing prices,
even if slightly, thereby giving us price signals and encouraging us to cre-
ate less carbon (consuming goods and services with less carbon).
Under this carbon tax regime, if Brazil continued to deforest
thereby emitting large amounts of GHG emissions, it would soon find
that with border tax adjustments (“BTA”) in place using the same emis-
sions intensity structure, its exports of manufactured goods, services and
energy would be non-competitive in the world marketplace. Within my
model, I developed a guideline that LULUCF emissions are cumulative.
This means that once the baseline year is set (be it 1990, 2005 or 2012), any
/index.php?map=2 [https://perma.cc/SMQ2-UXP5]. Note, Alaska and Montana have local
counties that add a local sales tax, but it is not collected state wide.
165 Emissions intensity is the level of emissions produced per $1000 of GDP (gross domes-
tic product). As an example, if the U.S. economy produces $15 trillion in GDP and releases
six billion tons of carbon emissions equivalent, then the rate is $2,500 of GDP produced
per one ton of carbon emissions. A $50 tax per ton of emissions would be the equivalent
of a $50 tax on $2500 worth of U.S. goods and services, which is equivalent to 2% tax rate
($50/$2500) = 2%. Therefore, a $25,000 car would be taxed $500 (2%), the same with $25,000
of services. The concept being all citizens based on their choices and consumption are
responsible for the country’s emissions. Giving a stake provides incentivizes everyone to
encourage the reduction of total emissions.
166 Id.
167 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 102.
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LULUCF emissions after this period are cumulative until the damage is
repaired.168 Brazilian emissions including LULUCF (as well as forest in-
tensity)169 results in a very high emissions intensity rate, that will impact
exports encouraging a vast majority of Brazilians to not only be opposed
to those cutting down the Amazon forest,170 but to take political action to
ensure the deforestation stops. The incentive from using emissions
intensity to tax imports would lead to areas that were deforested being
reforested as quickly as possible for a country to regain its competitive
position in the international marketplace. This structure would also lead
to less carbon intensive agricultural practices. The structure of this
carbon tax is purposeful to create large majorities from all political parties,
industry, unions, etc. to join forces to combat climate change against the
few who create large sources of emissions, thereby rending a country un-
competitive in global trade.171
B. The Tax Rate
The tax rate is set low to begin with and the increases are predeter-
mined in order to have the greatest impact at reducing total emissions.172
There were several objectives to creating this structure. First, setting the
initial rate low would make it more politically acceptable and signal to
consumers and producers a need to change. Because the tax is used to
build power plants, it is also necessary that the construction and manu-
facturing industries have time to ramp up production.173 This avoids
168 Correcting or reversing the damage would require taking steps such as reforestation
along with stopping deforestation. With this ingrained in a carbon tax policy and auto-
matically able to include it in a BTA, this would change behavior worldwide.
169 Stephen Sewalk & Vincent Buscarello, A New Lens for a New Perspective: The Emerging
Post-Kyoto Climate Policy Framework as Explained through a New Enviro-economic
Metrics, 6 J. EUEC (2013), available at http://www.euec.com/euecjournal.aspx [https://
perma.cc/HA9W-D7TF].
170 Emilio Lebre La Rovere & Andre Santos Pereira, Brazil Climate Change: A Country
Profile, SCIDEV (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://www.scidev.net/global/policy-brief
/brazil-climate-change-a-country-profile.html [https://perma.cc/W6TM-C3B2].
171 As an example, take a country with an economy of $900 billion and emissions of three bil-
lion tons. This would imply an emissions intensity of one ton of GHG emissions per $300
of GDP. At a $50 per ton carbon tax, this is equivalent to $50/$300 = 16.67% tax rate. If the
rate begins at $5/ton and increases within ten years to $50/ton, this country would have a
significant incentive to rapidly reduce emissions, or face BTA that would significantly
crimp its exports.
172 The tax rate begins at $5 per ton of carbon emissions, and increases by $5 per ton each
year until at year ten the rate plataeus at $50 per ton.
173 Robert J. Gordon, The Phillips Curve is Alive and Well: Inflation and the NAIRU During
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unnecessary demand inflation by giving the supply side time to build
capacity.174 This structure creates certainty for industry and consumers,
allowing everyone to plan for the future with the understanding that the
rate will increase, but so will the production of clean sources of energy.
TABLE 4: CARBON TAX RATE TABLE
Year Tax Rate Per Ton of CO2
1 $5.0
2 $10.0
3 $15.0
4 $20.0
5 $25.0
6 $30.0
7 $35.0
8 $40.0
9 $45.0
10 $50.0
11 $50.0
12 $50.0
13 $50.0
14 $50.0
15 $50.0
16 $50.0
17 $50.0
18 $50.0
19 $50.0
20 $50.0
1. Domestic Production and Imports
Trade is a critical area to discuss. Many authors of both cap-and-
trade and carbon tax papers believe that there is no simple and clear
the Slow Recovery, NBER, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19390 [https://perma
.cc/JAF3-MQXT].
174 John Berdell, An Early Supply-Side-Demand-Side Controversy: Petty, Law, Cantillion,
24 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 207, 207–17 (2010).
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legal method of implementing a BTA.175 However, I disagree. We know
that the purpose of a BTA is to counter what has occurred in the 1990s and
2000s, i.e., FDI escaping to developing countries with no emissions limits,
causing significant “carbon leakage.” Economic competitiveness has been
cause for concern in developed countries. It led the U.S. Senate to not
ratify Kyoto. It has also caused concern within the EU that the EU-ETS
and resulting carbon leakage is impacting corporate and country competi-
tiveness.176 Carbon leakage occurs because a trading area (EU) or developed
country adopts or pretends to adopt legislation limiting GHG emissions
(cap and trade), the effect is that emission dependent industries (those
heavily reliant on fossil fuels that are mobile manufactures) relocate opera-
tions to countries where there are no emissions restrictions or threats of
restrictions.177 Companies seeking to minimize costs (and environmental
regulations) of energy-intensive (high-carbon emitting) goods move pro-
duction to developing countries. The problem is that these developing
countries tend to be less energy efficient (releasing more emissions per
dollar of GDP) and as a result these moves produce more emissions.178
A good example of a BTA is a value-added tax (“VAT”), which is
used in over 140 countries.179 Applying a VAT is straightforward, as it
only requires data that should be easily available, which is why I use the
VAT structure for my carbon tax.180 The data needed for the VAT regard-
ing imports is simply the price of the good and, for exports, a confirma-
tion that the goods were actually exported.181
2. Exports and Imports
For this carbon tax, when it comes to exports, as with a VAT, they
are exempted; it is up to the importing country to tax the goods and
175 Id.
176 Stephanie Monjon & Phillippe Quirion, A Border Adjustment for the EU ETS: Recon-
ciling WTO Rules and Capacity to Tackle Carbon Leakage, 10 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF
THE EURO-LATIN STUDY NETWORK ON INTEGRATION AND TRADE 2 (2012).
177 Glen P. Peters & Edgar G. Hertwich, Trading Kyoto, 2 NATURE REP. 40, 40 (2008).
178 Id.
179 International Indirect Tax. Value-added Tax Services, KPMG, available at https://
www.kpmg.com/us/en/services/tax/indirect-taxes/vat-services/documents/vat-services.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YRQ6-PR2A] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
180 For a description of how VATs and consumption taxes work, see David A. Weisbach,
Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 603–13 (2000).
181 CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., THE VALUE-ADDED TAX: KEY TO DEFICIT REDUCTION? 15–20,
23–25 (1987).
2016] DESIGNING A BETTER CARBON TAX 799
services. For imports, just like the VAT, it is necessary to know the origi-
nating country (and therefore its carbon intensity) as well as the price of
the goods (or services). The only difference is the need to know how much
emissions were produced by the ship carrying the goods. This is impor-
tant because no country claims shipping emissions—a key dilemma in the
existing structure of measuring total emissions.182 By having shipping
emissions added to each shipment and adding the emissions intensity, it
is easy to calculate the respective carbon tax on the imported goods. Each
country would have its own emissions intensity. Calculating shipping
emissions is quite easy, as it is based on fuel consumed and the type of
fuel. The EU has been attempting to regulate shipping emissions, and
my system would account not only for emissions intensity of goods but
also for shipping emissions.183 However, each trading region or country,
to avoid WTO litigation, would need to set up their carbon tax to comply
with the WTO. For the United States, this means each state and terri-
tory would need to have its own carbon tax level, and for the EU, each
country would need its own carbon tax level, thereby not biasing another
country based on energy inputs into the production process.184 Solving
the border tax adjustment is key to implementing a successful carbon tax
and very important in terms of successfully reducing not only U.S. or EU
emissions, but also global emissions.
C. Tax Revenue Usage (Need for Reinvestment)
There are many uses for revenue raised by a carbon tax. However,
the objective of developing and designing a carbon tax should not be to
raise monies to simply return them to the public (with minimal impact
on emissions except those caused by the price elasticity of demand), nor
should it be to create revenues for deficit prone governments. Rather the
objective should be to maximize the impact on reducing emissions. As
shown in section I, all of the proposals simply reallocate money, relying
on price to change behavior and hoping that technology will evolve that
will magically reduce emissions.
182 Jessica L. Hardcastle, Emissions Rules Set to Increase Shipping Costs, ENVTL. READER,
Oct. 9, 2013, available at http://www.environmentalleader.com/2013/10/09/emissions
-rules-set-to-increase-shipping-costs/ [https://perma.cc/H54B-CFXU].
183 Id.
184 Stephen Sewalk, A Carbon Tax with Reinvestment is WTO Compatible, 25 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 17, 17 (2014).
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Given that we have the technology today to create an emissions-free
world, I designed this tax to invest in this technology. I do so in this scheme
by taking all of the revenue raised by the carbon tax and reinvesting it
into building alternative, renewable and nuclear power. This includes
wind, solar,185 and deep geothermal, among others, thereby encouraging
the production of these energy sources by ordering and finding acceptable
sites for them.186 Furthermore, funding is invested into integrating the
power grid between regions and countries, to share power more effec-
tively and efficiently, see Figure 7. This helps to minimize the amount of
new power plants that need to be built.
Figure 7. North American Energy Interconnections
Source: Michael Jaeger, Washington Times, August 1, 2012
185 Solar includes not only residential photovoltaic (“PV”), but large scale PV and Thermal
as well as Transpired Solar Air Collectors.
186 Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a Reality: Finding Ways to Site Wind
Power Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 635, 635 (2008).
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In doing so, developing a greater cleaner power supply that is
more reliable187 and by connecting the interconnections we would allow
our power systems to operate more efficiently, as peak power demand
occurs at different times across the country.188 Further, funds are invested
in Smart Grid189 to allow utilities to more efficiently use power while mini-
mizing peak power loads.190
Rather than rely on higher prices resulting in shifts in consumer
demand, this tax proactively changes the power supply, reducing the
supply of emissions, thereby decreasing the carbon intensity of all goods
and services. Due to the tax being allocated to construct power plants, the
result is significant new construction leading to job creation and a re-
vived manufacturing base, thereby stimulating the economy, leading to
a planned reduction in emissions and a declining total tax collected be-
cause of collapsing emissions. This combined impact results in a signifi-
cant decline in total carbon or greenhouse gas emissions.191 This forms
the foundation for the Carbon Tax with Reinvestment (“CTR”).192
D. Impact to Consumers’ Wallets (Economics)
How do the economics of the CTR work? First, we begin with a
simple figure to compare emissions intensity and cost of energy for one
American, see Figure 8.
187 Juan Manuel Carrasco et al., Power-Electronic Systems for the Grid: Integration of Re-
newable Energy Sources: A Survey, 53 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS
(2006), available at http://ecee.colorado.edu/~ecen4517/materials/refs/inverters/Carrasco
GridIntegration2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U44-QGR2].
188 A. Ipakchi & F. Albuyeh, Grid of the future, 7 POWER & ENERGY 52–62 (2009), available
at http://kzx-thesis-beta.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/%E6%96%87%E6%A1%A3/grid%20of
%20the%20future.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GPK-MF6E].
189 The Smart Grid: An Introduction, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, available at http://energy
.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages(1).pdf
[https://perma.cc/X5GY-DEXY].
190 Jeff St. John, Making the Case for Smart Grid to Shave Peak Power, GREEN TECH
MEDIA (Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/making
-the-case-for-smart-grid-to-shave-peak-power [https://perma.cc/Q66P-GJPA].
191 Figure 9 shows the decrease in anticipated demand for goods and services with high
CO2 emissions resulting in a decline in total emissions. This is a shift in demand from
Quantity Demanded to Qd*. The most significant shift however occurs on the supply side,
as supply shifts from Quantity Supplied to Qs*. This is a result of changing the power
sector to clean power, as shown in Figures 5 and 6.
192 Stephen Sewalk, Carbon Tax with Reinvestment Trumps Cap-and-Trade, 30 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 580, 580 (2013). This article demonstrated why a CTR is much better than
a cap-and-trade; however, it does not contain an explanation of the development behind
the design of the tax.
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Figure 8. Cost of Carbon Energy vs. GDP per Ton of Emissions
As Figure 8 illustrates, under the current scenario (no carbon tax or cap-
and-trade) the United States emits approximately 0.4 tons of carbon per
$1,000 of GDP. Putting this in a different perspective, the United States
creates $2,500 of GDP for every ton of carbon emitted.193 The average
American produces approximately 18.9 tons of carbon per year and spends
$3,460 per year on energy, which is approximately equivalent to $183 per
ton of carbon.194 Therefore, this graph matches emissions per $1,000 of
GDP and the amount of money that an average American will spend on
energy each year. This is important to demonstrate what would happen
if a $50 per ton carbon tax is applied. If the average American consumes
18.9 tons of carbon and a $50 per ton carbon tax, this would increase an
average American’s energy bill from $3460 to $4404, as seen in Figure 9,
assuming people had the additional monies to spend.195
193 International Energy Statistics, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/cfapps
/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=91&pid=46&aid=31 [https://perma.cc/Z3WX-USAB] (last
accessed Jan. 20, 2016).
194 2009 Energy Expenditure Per Person, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/maps
/2009-energy-expenditure-person [https://perma.cc/DFF3-QGY9] (last visited Mar. 20,
2016).
195 Using $50 per ton and multiplying by 18.9 tons of carbon would result in an additional
cost of $945. If we add $3460 + $945 = $4405.
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Figure 9. Impact of $50 Carbon Tax
However, the actual bill never increases to $4,404, because the average
person could not afford this, leading to a more energy efficient economy
as people use energy more efficiently.196 The intersection between the
Quantity-Demanded curve and the Quantity-Supplied curve is $3,460 in
energy spent per person and 0.4 tons of carbon emissions per $1,000 of
U.S. GDP.197 Imposing the carbon tax of $50 per ton shifts the supply
curve. The total cost of energy would now be equivalent to $183 + $50 =
$233. $233 x 18.9 (tons of carbon consumed) = $4,404 per person. As a
result, emissions decline due to reduced demand, as all goods (and ser-
vices) become more expensive. This results in the intersection between
Quantity-Demanded and Qs* (with a carbon tax of $50). The economy
becomes more energy efficient as energy use declines, but this comes at
a high cost to households as noted by the previously mentioned studies.
How would a Carbon Tax with Reinvestment (“CTR”) affect in-
dustry and households and could a properly designed Carbon Tax actually
incentivize growth, maintain standards of living, and significantly reduce
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196 This could include planning trips, less driving, using public transport, turning the
temperature down in the house, turning off lights more frequently, using CFL and LED
lights, as well as purchasing more fuel efficient autos and appliances and making a home
(or building) more energy efficient.
197 See, e.g., Espey, supra note 126.
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emissions? The revenues raised are used to build new power plants, creat-
ing significant levels of new jobs and economic output. The result is a new
power infrastructure that is clean in comparison to the existing structure.
As households pay for the power plants the cost of future power (electricity)
declines, as Utilities did not pay for the infrastructure. As a result, the
Public Utility Commissions no longer needs to reward utilities with returns
on assets paid for by the populace. The shift in quantity is tremendous
and clearly outpaces the impact of purely rising costs from the carbon tax,
as shown in Figure 10. As a governmental goal, reducing energy costs for
people and for families is very important to maintain standards of living
and happiness.198 The CTR promotes not only improved energy efficiency,
but also cleaner energy, thereby essentially eliminating the need to sub-
sidize clean energy by actually purchasing it.
Figure 10. Impact of a Carbon Tax with Reinvestment
As seen in Figure 10, Qs* ($50 carbon tax) now intersects with Qd*
(“CTR”). The results are clearly impressive. Although household costs
increased due to the tax, the rebate in the form of cheaper, cleaner energy
results in a net savings to households and industry, bringing down per
198 Mark Calabria, Reducing Energy Costs Offers Potential to Reduce Financial Burdens
for All Families, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/reducing
-energy-costs-offers-potential-reduce-financial-burdens-all-families/ [https://perma.cc/MG6E
-JUJL] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
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capita costs of energy to approximately $2,500 per year within twenty
years. The neutrality of the CTR is preserved by refunding the tax col-
lected through cheaper, cleaner power in the relatively near future. As
the CTR also creates the structure for a BTA this means that a country’s
international competitiveness increases as energy costs drop due to clean
energy. The new equilibrium shows energy efficiency improved by more
than 52% (reduction in emissions) as well as reduced energy costs, all
within twenty years. Consumers (emitters) paying for the power infra-
structure would introduce an era of cheap, clean power that would elec-
trify the economy. More importantly, this result shows it is possible to
create a carbon tax using reinvestment that actually stimulates growth,
maintains or increases standards of living, while significantly reducing
emissions—all feats that no one has so far been able to accomplish.
The WTO199 compliant tax results in no incentive to invest in pro-
duction in noncompliant regions and therefore no carbon leakage200—re-
sulting in an incentive for other countries to adopt this tax structure and
leading to a worldwide abatement effort for GHG emissions.201 A universal,
easy-to-calculate tax on carbon quantities would eliminate equity and
discrimination concerns and avoid breaching WTO laws regarding import
taxes “in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products,”202 as the rates would be applied uniformly to like regions.
Note that a flat carbon tax imposed uniformly on total emissions
without calculating emissions intensity may be subject to the most favored
nation principle.203 Although the tax is a single rate for all countries, each
country emits different types of GHG. GHG emissions in 2010 came pre-
dominantly from three sources, all fossil fuels.204 Additionally, different
countries use different sources to produce energy, resulting in different
199 Eric Phillips, World Trade and the Environment: The Café Case, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L.
827, 842 (1996); see generally Sewalk, supra note 184.
200 Carbon leakage occurs when industry moves to countries with no effective carbon
limits (tax or cap-and-trade). These goods are then imported into regions with these
regulations, thereby increasing total emissions. A carbon tax with reinvestment results
in an effective Border Tax Adjustment (“BTA”). As there is no advantage to move, i.e., all
goods and services are taxed, industry does not move solely because of the imposition of
this carbon tax scheme.
201 Sewalk, supra note 184, at 377.
202 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
203 Id. at art. I.
204 46% of emissions were from coal, 33% were from fuel, and 20% were from gas. Recent
trends in world CO2 emissions from fuel combustion, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, available at
https://www.iea.org/media/news/2015/news/151104_webarticle_CO2_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YU7J-MFVH] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
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emission intensities. China produces 70% of its power from coal,205 while
France gets a majority of its power (75%) from nuclear energy.206
Consequently, countries will be able to argue that the energy in-
puts from different sources are not like inputs and therefore imposing a
uniform tax rate on every type of emissions is favoring certain nations
over others since the emissions come from different makeups.207 Treating
all different types of energy resources equally will result in discrimination
and a violation of Article I of GATT.208 This is because the tax is calculated
by looking at the amount of GDP per ton of emissions, resulting in an emis-
sions intensity of GDP per ton of CO2 equivalent, essentially an input.209
III. REDUCING EMISSIONS BY APPLYING THE TAX
A. The Tax Applied
The existing carbon tax proposals, as well as the current cap-and-
trade proposals, cannot guarantee with any level of certainty the reduc-
tion of U.S., EU, or global carbon emissions. For legislation to be effective,
it is necessary that it be proactive. Proactive legislation would incorpo-
rate all emitters and provide assurance that emissions will be reduced
by addressing supply and demand.
A more efficient, effective and simpler approach to shrinking emis-
sions would utilize a market-based approach and model the carbon tax
as a CTR. As proposed this CTR structure taxes all carbon consumers
using a downstream approach, as compared to the upstream limited ap-
proach of the cap-and-trade proposals. The tax structure therein incorpo-
rates all societal costs of GHG emissions, thereby promoting accountability
and a reduction in emissions. However, unlike the cap-and-trade where
revenues would go to general government funding, the CTR uses the
funding to reinvest in clean power infrastructure. This payoff provides
producers and consumers with a clear message of the harm caused by
carbon emissions and the reinvestment resulting in the construction of
clean energy facilities and elimination of polluting facilities clearly em-
phasizes this message.
205 China produces and consumes almost as much coal as the rest of the world, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 14, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id
=16271 [https://perma.cc/3WGX-63X2] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
206 Nuclear Power in France, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOC., http://www.world-nuclear.org/info
/inf40.html [https://perma.cc/LUL4-JCS4] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
207 Phillips, supra note 199.
208 Sewalk, supra note 184, at 388.
209 Id.
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B. Role of Emissions Intensity
To avoid discriminating by source, this is solved by the United
States adopting a fifty U.S. State + Territory + D.C. individual CTR rates.
The EU-27 would adopt a minimum of twenty-seven CTR rates, meaning
each U.S. State will have its own carbon (value added) tax structure. In
this manner U.S. states replicate the majority of the world’s countries in
terms of emissions intensity as seen in Table 5, the same with the EU-27.
TABLE 5: EMISSIONS INTENSITY, COMPARING U.S. STATES VS.
SELECT COUNTRIES
$ of GDP per Ton of CO2 Emissions
Alabama $892.86 India $448.43
California $3,703.70 Japan $3,448.28
France $4,000.00
Washington $2,941.18 United Kingdom $3,571.43
Colorado $1,886.79 Euro Area $2,500.00
United States $2,040.82
Texas $1,250.00 Australia $1,298.70
Wyoming $305.81 China $312.50
Source: Table 5 Emissions intensities using 2005 comprehensive data
set. Current Dollar GDP and Emissions data for U.S. states provided by
the U.S. Energy Information Association210 and the World Recourses
Institute’s Climate Analysis Indicator Tool (“CAIT”),211 respectively. GDP
for countries from World Bank.212
This is done so that a BTA can be applied to imported goods (and
services) and so that it is easy to calculate as the information is easily
available.
210 State energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by year, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ASSOC.,
http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/analysis/pdf/table1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/LA39-9ZEB] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
211 Greg Fuhs, A New, One-Stop Shop for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, WORLD RE-
SOURCES INST. (July 10, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/07/new-one-stop-shop-green
house-gas-emissions-data [https://perma.cc/LXV2-WZ53] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
212 World Development Report, supra note 34. Stephen Sewalk & Vincent Buscarello, A
new lens for a new perspective: The emerging post-Kyoto climate policy framework as
explained through new enviro-econometrics, 6 J. EUEC 13, 13 (2013).
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C. A Simple, Functioning Tax + Transportation Policy
“Keep it simple” is a good motto, and a carbon tax with reinvest-
ment is fundamentally simple. My proposal calls for the tax to start at $5
per ton of carbon contained within a good or service based on emissions
intensity.213 To simply further, the tax is calculated based on the price of
a good and paid at the register, much like a sales or value added tax.
Using emissions intensity implies everyone is responsible for emitting
carbon or GHG, therefore no one is exempt from the tax. The tax starts
at a low level and increases by $5 per ton of carbon per year.214 This ramp
up provides: (1) price certainty to industry and consumers; (2) certainty
for investment; (3) time for the construction industry to ramp up their ca-
pacity in production as well as their work force, while avoiding demand-
led inflation; and (4) to simplify the adoption of this tax as a border tax
adjustment (“BTA”).
If utilities and industry, as well as buildings, only had access to
clean power this would significantly reduce global emissions, hence why
I developed the concept of reinvestment with a carbon tax, leading to the
construction of new, clean, emissions free power to replace current power
generation. A building with clean power produces no emissions, the same
with industry.215 A carbon tax with reinvestment essentially solves emis-
sions from utilities and buildings, effectively driving emissions in these
sectors to zero within thirty years. By cleaning up these sectors, it is then
possible to examine transportation, which I briefly mention here and
present, but leave the details for a future paper. Transportation today is
heavily dependent on gasoline and diesel.216 A CTR could subsidize the
213 Emissions intensity is the amount of emissions contained in a dollar of GDP. Put
another way, it is easy to calculate, take GDP and divide by total emissions. For the
United States this would be $15 trillion / 6 billion tons of carbon or GHG emissions
resulting in the fact that for everyone $2,500 of GDP, one ton of carbon or GHG emissions
is produced. To reduce global emissions we need to produce more GDP per ton of
emissions or in the converse, we need fewer emissions per dollar of goods and services
produced.
214 See infra Figures 1 and 2, for the revenues calculated from the carbon tax, beginning
at $5/ton in year one and increasing by $5/ton each year until the tax reaches $50/ton in
year ten. The revenues are calculated as a percent of the U.S. and the EU-27 GDPs.
215 Clean Energy, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy
[https://perma.cc/4V2E-ZB43] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
216 How We Use Energy, Transportation, THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, http://needtoknow
.nas.edu/energy/energy-use/transportation/ [https://perma.cc/2URR-QWRR] (last visited
Mar. 20, 2016).
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introduction of automobiles powered by electricity (battery) as well as
hydrogen fuel cells. The United States currently has enough generating
capacity to power an entire fleet of plug-in vehicles.217 By replacing the cur-
rent power generation capacity of utilities, we could then cleanly power
225 million plug-in cars by 2050.218 This is very important to reducing emis-
sions from transport, given that personal vehicle use accounts for over 60%,
while the remainder comes from buses, trucks, rail, ships and aircraft.219
Let us employ a simple application of this concept. Currently
Brazil,220 a major hydroelectric producer, and Australia,221 a natural gas
producer, export significant amounts of iron ore to China. Exports total
approximately 800 million tons of iron ore.222 This rock ore burns more
fuel to transport because it is heavier than steel; it is shipped by rail using
diesel fuel to port; it is loaded on a ship that burns bunker fuel, which is
bottom-of-the-barrel, heavily polluting fuel; and when it arrives in China,
it is shipped by rail again to a steel smelter that uses coal to produce
steel.223 Under a CTR, this would be prohibitive and Chinese steel would
no longer be competitive in world markets.224 Instead, a CTR would refocus
Brazil to create jobs locally to mine the ore with clean production methods
and smelt the ore into steel using hydroelectric power. The steel is shipped
to China and other destinations on (hydro) electric-powered trains to ships
using batteries, fuel cells, or nuclear power. The same results processed
217 MICHAEL J. SCOTT ET AL., IMPACTS ASSESSMENT OF PLUG-IN HYBRID VEHICLES ON
ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND REGIONAL U.S. POWER GRIDS, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL
LABORATORY (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.roguevalleycleancities.org/images/news
.html/PNNL%20Articles/PHEV_Economic_Analysis_Part2_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/AW6C-CVG2].
218 Id.
219 Transportation’s Role in Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Volume 1: Synthesis
Report, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, (2010) (report to Congress), available at http://ntl
.bts.gov/lib/32000/32700/32779/DOT_Climate_Change_Report_-_April_2010_-_Volume_1
_and_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/66U7-RXU7]; Reducing emissions from transport, EUR. COMM.
ON CLIMATE ACTION, available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/index_en
.htm [https://perma.cc/8V7Z-URYC].
220 Clyde Russell, Australia, Brazil boost China iron ore import share, but not enough,
REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-russell-ironore-china
-idUSKCN0V5147 [https://perma.cc/9J22-4LP3].
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Fact Sheet: Steel and raw materials, WORLDSTEEL ASS’N, https://www.worldsteel.org
/publications/fact-sheets/content/00/text_files/file0/document/fact_raw%20materials_2014
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SZQ-WAQ3] (last updated Oct. 2014).
224 David L. Chandler, One order of steel; hold the greenhouse gases, MIT NEWS (May 8,
2013), http://news.mit.edu/2013/steel-without-greenhouse-gas-emissions-0508 [https://
perma.cc/4CNV-R3LT].
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in a different manner reduce emissions from approximately 1.6 billion tons
of CO2 to less than 500 million tons, or 67% fewer emissions.225
What would happen, therefore, if we adopted a carbon tax with
reinvestment with a simple rule that starting in 2030 all gas and diesel
powered vehicles need to be replaced with electric batteries or fuel cells
by 2060? To achieve this, a policy to replace all vehicles over thirty years
could be adopted, meaning a minimum of 7.5 million vehicles per year
need to be fuel cell or battery powered. The policy would need to include
a transition from gasoline and diesel to these new fuel sources, resulting
in no more sales of fossil fuels after 2060. I modeled this in Figure 11
through 2050. Through 2060, emissions drop 95% and by 2017 I believe
it is possible for to drop approximately 98% based on my models.
Figure 11. A CTR with an Electric/Fuel-Cell Vehicle Policy
Building and Utility/Industry emissions reach zero in 2048. By 2050,
total U.S. emissions have declined by 90% compared to 2012 emission
levels.226
225 See Saving One Barrell of Oil per Ton (SOBOT): A New Roadmap for Transformation of
Steelmaking Process, AM. IRON & STEEL INST. (Oct. 2005), https://www.steel.org/~
/media/Files/AISI/Public%20Policy/saving_one_barrel_oil_per_ton.pdf [https://perma.cc
/SKA2-VNLH] (Author estimates in combination with the SOBOT Report resulted in the
estimate of 1.6 billion tons of CO2 to less than 500 million tons (or 67% fewer emissions)).
226 Table 1-11: Number of U.S. Aircraft, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances, DOT,
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CONCLUSION
The world needs a climate change policy that effectively and effi-
ciently reduces greenhouse gas emissions. A carbon tax system with rein-
vestment results in a combined reduction in demand due to higher prices
as well as reducing the supply by changing our power grid. This policy is
proactive and produces results, but it needs to be supplemented with a
transport directive to replace all fossil fuel powered vehicles with fuel cell
and battery/electric vehicles. Doing so, we can reduce U.S. emissions by up-
wards of 90% by 2050 and 95% by 2060, and 98% by 2070. The BTA of a
CTR would readily encourage other nations to adopt a CTR and transport
policy directive to avoid being locked out of the world’s largest consumer
market (the United States) by having a CTR applied as a BTA on their
exports of goods and services. As with the VAT, I would anticipate this
policy would be rapidly adopted across countries once implemented by one
major country, which I hope to show in another paper using Game Theory.
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation
_statistics/html/table_01_11.html [https://perma.cc/BJ95-JXQY] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).

